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In Re Marriage Cases: The Fundamental
Right to Marry and Equal Protection
Under the California Constitution and the
Effects of Proposition 8
by RICHARD SALAS*
I. Introduction
On May 15, 2008, the highest state court in the most populous state of
the union-California-struck down the limitation on marriage to a union
"between a man and a woman"' in the landmark decision In re Marriage
Cases.2 One month later, county clerks in California began issuing
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.3 However, the legal battle had only
* J.D. Candidate 2010, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.S. 2004,
Animal Physiology & Neuroscience and Psychology, University of California, San Diego. I
would like to thank the CLQ staff for all their support in helping me write this Case Comment. I
would also like to thank Professor Elizabeth Hillman for her guidance. Most of all I would like to
thank my parents for their endless support and love in all my endeavors and through all the
detours.
1. The limitation on marriage to a union between a man and a woman is found twice in the
California Family Code. It appears first in subdivision (a) of the California Family Code and
provides in pertinent part that "[m]arriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract
between a man and a woman, to which the consent of the parties capable of making that contract
is necessary." CAL. FAM. CODE § 300(a) (West 2008), invalidated in part by In re Marriage
Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757 (Cal. 2008).
The limitation appears again in § 308.5 of the California Family Code, an initiative
statute submitted to and approved by the California voters as Proposition 22 at the March 7, 2000
election that provides in full that "[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or
recognized in California." CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2008), invalidated by In re Marriage
Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757.
2. In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757.
3. It is reported that approximately 15,000 to 20,000 same-sex marriages took place in
California following this decision. Ballotpedia.org, California Proposition 8 (2008),
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php?title=CalifomiaProposition_8-(2008) (last visited Feb. 5,
2009).
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just begun, because on November 4, 2008, a slim majority of California
voters passed Proposition 8 into law.4 Proposition 8 states in relevant part
that "[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California., 5  The next day, the state of California halted the issuance of
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Petitions were filed almost
immediately in the California courts seeking to enjoin and invalidate
Proposition 8.6
As this Case Comment goes to print, the litigation surrounding the
validity of Proposition 8 is still pending. Whether or not same-sex couples
will be granted the right to marry is again in the hands of the California
Supreme Court. While Proposition 8 may have relegated same-sex couples
back to having their official family relationship called something other than
marriage, it does not amend or overrule some of the more basic
fundamental rights recognized by In re Marriage Cases. In ruling that
same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry in California, the
court built a foundation of rights that exceed simply the right to the term
"marriage." This Case Comment will first provide an in-depth view of the
analysis employed by the majority in In Re Marriage Cases. Next, because
the decision was highly controversial among the seven justices of
California's highest court-rendered 4-3-this Case Comment will discuss
the opinions of the dissenting justices and, more specifically, what aspects
of the majority opinion they believe are erroneous. Finally, although In Re
Marriage Cases has been overshadowed by the passage of Proposition 8,
this Case Comment will discuss the aspects of the decision that have
survived it.
II. The Holdings of In re Marriage Cases
In re Marriage Cases is a revolutionary legal decision in the struggle
for gay rights and sets important precedent apart from bestowing the
designation of "marriage" upon the officially recognized family
4. On December 13, 2008, the Secretary of State certified that Proposition 8 passed by
7,001,084 votes (52.3 percent) in favor of the proposition compared to 6,401,482 votes (47.7
percent) opposed to the proposition. Answer Brief in Response to Petition for Extraordinary
Relief at 8, Tyler v. State, No. S168047 (Cal. Dec. 19, 2008), available at http://www.courtinfo.c
a.gov/courts/supreme/highprofile/documents/s 168066-answer-brief- petition.pdf.
5. The language of Proposition 8 as it appeared on the November 4, 2008 California
statewide election ballot. It is identical to Proposition 22 as it appeared on the March 7, 2000
California statewide primary election ballot.
6. For a list of all the Proposition 8 cases filed with the Califomia Supreme Court, see
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme/highprofile/prop8.htn#casefilings (last visited Mar. 8,
2009).
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relationship of same-sex couples in California. Marriage may be one of the
ultimate goals of the gay rights movement, but the legal ramifications of
this decision reach beyond marriage. The majority opinion contained four
major holdings: (1) The California Constitution guarantees to all
individuals and couples the fundamental right to marry, regardless of their
sexual orientation, (2) sexual orientation is a constitutionally suspect class
for purposes of the California equal protection clause, and statutes that
draw distinctions based on sexual orientation are subject to strict scrutiny
analysis; (3) strict scrutiny must apply because the marriage statutes
impinged on same-sex couples' fundamental, constitutionally protected
privacy interests, thereby creating unequal and detrimental consequences to
them and their children; and (4) the marriage statutes' limitation on
marriage as a union between a man and a woman did not serve a
compelling state interest and, therefore, violated California's equal
protection clause.7 The court prefaced its decision by explaining what it
considered to be a fundamental difference in its analysis of the issue of gay
marriage compared to other appellate and state supreme courts that had
recently considered the issue.
When a statute is challenged as unconstitutional under the California
Constitution, the reviewing court must consider other relevant statutes
relating to how the state treats the affected persons in regard to the issues
on which the challenge is based.8 Here, the other relevant statutes include
California's comprehensive domestic partnership legislation. 9 Under this
statutory scheme, same-sex couples may register as a Domestic
Partnership, which is an officially recognized familial and legal
relationship granting domestic partners "virtually all of the same
substantive legal benefits and privileges, and imposes .. .virtually all of
the same legal obligations and duties[] that California law affords to and
imposes upon a married couple." 10 In light of these statutes, the court
framed the issue less narrowly than whether it is unconstitutional for the
state to allow opposite-sex couples to marry and to deny same-sex couples
the right to an officially recognized legal relationship or marriage. Instead,
the court framed the issue as
7. In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th at 757.
8. Id. at 779 (citing Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 862 (Cal. 1973)).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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whether our state Constitution prohibits the state from establishing a
statutory scheme in which both opposite-sex and same-sex couples
are granted the right to enter into an officially recognized family
relationship that affords all of the significant legal rights and
obligations . . . of marriage, but under which the union of an
opposite-sex couple is officially designated a "marriage" whereas the
union of a same-sex couple is officially designated a "domestic
partnership."'
'I
The court began by determining the nature and scope of the right to
marry.
A. The Fundamental Constitutional "Right to Marry" Under the
California Constitution
While the state constitution does not explicitly grant a right to marry,
past California cases have established the right to marry as fundamental
and "one of the basic, inalienable civil rights guaranteed to an individual by
the California Constitution."' 2 This inalienable right is embodied as an
integral component of an individual's interest in liberty and personal
autonomy protected by the due process and privacy clauses of the
California Constitution. 13 The status of marriage as a fundamental right
was not in controversy, but the court had to determine its scope and
content. The Court of Appeal had concluded that the state constitutional
right to marry should be interpreted as limited to the right to marry a person
of the opposite sex because marriage in California had always been limited
to opposite-sex couples.' 4 The Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiffs'
claim that their fundamental right to marry was denied and concluded that
plaintiffs were asking the court to recognize a new constitutional right-
namely, the "right to same-sex marriage."1 5 The California Supreme Court
disagreed with this characterization of the right and invoked Perez v. Sharp
for support.16 In Perez, a seminal California marriage case, the California
Supreme Court struck down the state statutes prohibiting interracial
marriage because they infringed upon the fundamental constitutional right
11. Id. at 779-80.
12. Id. at 781.
13. Id. at 810. Unlike the federal Constitution, privacy is explicitly listed as an inalienable
right in article 1, section 1 of the California Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
14. In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th at 811.
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711 (Cal. 1948)).
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to marry. 17 In declaring these statutes unconstitutional, the court did not
characterize the right sought by the plaintiffs as a "right to interracial
marriage."' 8  Instead, the Perez court focused on the substance of the
constitutional right to marry as "the freedom to join in marriage with the
person of one's choice."' 9 Furthermore, while anti-miscegenation statutes
had existed since the founding of the state, Perez made clear that "history
alone is not invariably an appropriate guide for determining the meaning
and scope of this fundamental constitutional guarantee. 2 °  The court
concluded that the right at issue was the fundamental right to marry, and it
focused on the substance of this right.
The court reasoned that Perez and other subsequent decisions
concerning the right to marry have all recognized that marriage is linked
with establishing a home and raising children, and that civil marriage is the
means available to create this officially recognized family.2 1 The court
cited cases that promote marriage as being "the center of personal
affections that ennoble and enrich human life, 22 and as being "the most
socially productive and individually fulfilling relationship that one can
enjoy in the course of a lifetime. 23  While society as a whole has an
interest in the institution of marriage, past California cases have recognized
that the right to marry rests with the individual and the couple.24
The court concluded that the right to marry is a basic, constitutionally
protected civil right, and that past California cases have established this
right as comprising a core set of substantive legal rights and characteristics,
traditionally associated with marriage, that are so intertwined with an
individual's liberty and personal autonomy that these rights cannot be
eliminated by the legislature or through a voter-approved statutory
17. Perez, 32Cal. 2dat711.
18. In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th at 811.
19. Perez, 32 Cal. 2d at 715, 717 (emphasis added). Justice Corrigan disagreed with
majority's reliance on Perez. In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th at 880 ("The majority places
great reliance on the Perez court's statement that "the right to marry is the right to join in marriage
with the person of one's choice." (quoting Perez, 32 Cal. 2d at 715)). "However, Perez and the
many other cases establishing the fundamental right to marry were all based on the common
understanding of marriage as the union of a man and a woman... Because those cases involved
the traditional definition of marriage, they do not support the majority's analysis." In re Marriage
Cases, 43 Cal. 4th at 880 (Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting).
20. Id. at 781 (majority opinion) (citing Perez, 32 Cal. 2d at 711).
21. Id. at813.
22. Id. (quoting DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 863-64 (Cal. 1952)).
23. Id. (quoting Eldon v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 274-75 (Cal. 1988)).
24. Id. at 816.
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initiative.2 5  This core substantive content includes the right of an
individual, along with the person they have chosen to share their life with,
to establish a legally recognized relationship that is "entitled to the same
respect and dignity accorded a union traditionally designated as
marriage., 26 In light of these determinations about the fundamental right to
marry and its importance for the opportunity to live a happy and
meaningful life, the California Supreme Court concluded that these rights
cannot depend on a person's sexual orientation.27  The California
Constitution guarantees this right to all citizens, whether gay or straight.
Similar to when the court recognized it was no longer constitutionally
legitimate to treat racial minorities as inferior or women as less capable
than men, it now recognizes that sexual orientation is not a legitimate
reason to withhold or restrict an individual's legal rights.28
Arguing for California, the attorney general asserted that as long as
the state grants a couple all of the same substantive legal rights traditionally
associated with marriage, it does not violate the constitutional right to
marry by designating a same-sex couple's officially recognized relationship
by a term other than "marriage. 29 In response, the court held that part of
the fundamental constitutional right to establish an officially recognized
family relationship embodies the right to have that relationship "accorded
the same dignity, respect, and stature as that accorded to all other officially
recognized family relationships. 3 ° Using a different term to designate the
official family relationship of same-sex couples, while reserving the term
marriage for opposite-sex couples, will at the very least pose "a serious risk
of denying the official family relationship of same-sex couples the equal
dignity and respect that is a core element of the constitutional right to
marry. 31  Based on this risk, the court held that although the current
domestic partnership statutes grant same-sex couples all or most of the
substantive legal rights and responsibilities inherent in the fundamental
constitutional right to marry, "[T]he current California statutes nonetheless
must be viewed as potentially impinging upon a same-sex couple's
[fundamental] constitutional right to marry under the California
25. Id. at 781.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 820.
28. Id. at 823.
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Constitution." 32 The court left open the question of whether or not the term
"marriage" itself is a core element of the right to marry, and whether the
state could constitutionally assign a term other than marriage to the official
family relationship of all couples.
33
B. The Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution and
Suspect Classification
The court reasoned that the distinction drawn by the statutes between
same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples "raises constitutional concerns
not only under the state constitutional right to marry, but also under the
state constitutional equal protection clause. 34 The court began its equal
protection analysis by determining which standard of review should be
applied to the challenged statutes. Under the California state equal
protection clause, the "rational basis" standard of review is ordinarily
applicable when determining whether different treatment imposed by a
statutory provision or scheme violates the clause.35 However, when the
different treatment imposed by the challenged statute or scheme relies upon
a so-called "suspect classification" or when it infringes upon a fundamental
right, the "more exacting and rigorous standard of review-' strict
scrutiny'-is applied" to determine the constitutionality of the challenged
statute or statutes.36
The parties challenging the constitutional validity of the statutory
scheme contended that the statutes must be subject to the strict scrutiny
standard because they (1) discriminate on the basis of gender, a suspect
classification; (2) discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation; and (3)
impinge upon a fundamental right.37 The court rejected the argument that
the challenged statutory scheme discriminates on the basis of gender.
38
However, the court did find that that the statutory scheme "must be viewed
as directly classifying and prescribing distinct treatment on the basis of
sexual orientation. 3 9 The court rejected the defendants argument that the
marriage statutes do not directly classify or discriminate based on sexual
32. Id. at 783.
33. Id. at 782.
34. Id. at 783.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 833.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 839.
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orientation, but, at most, have a disparate impact on homosexuals because
the marriage statutes are not facially discriminatory and do not prohibit a
gay person from marrying a person of the opposite sex.4 °
Whether sexual orientation should be considered a "suspect
classification" under the California equal protection clause, triggering the
strict scrutiny standard of review for statutes drawing distinctions on this
basis, was a matter of first impression in California. 41 To be considered a
constitutionally suspect class for purposes of applying the California equal
protection clause, there are three general requirements: (1) the class is
based on an immutable trait, (2) the immutable trait bears no relation to a
person's ability to perform or contribute to society, and (3) the immutable
trait is associated with a "stigma of inferiority and second class citizenship"
manifested by the group's history of legal and social disabilities.42 The
California Supreme Court and the California Court of Appeal determined
that sexual orientation easily met the latter two requirements.43 However,
the Court of Appeal considered the issue of whether or not sexual
orientation is an immutable trait to be a factual question without a
sufficient record from the trial court to resolve on appeal.44 Therefore, the
appellate court applied rational basis review and upheld the challenged
statutes.45
On further appeal, the California Supreme Court held that the
appellate court erred in rejecting sexual orientation as a suspect
classification because of the factual question of the immutability of sexual
46 thcororientation. As the court explained, "[I]mmutability is not invariably
required in order for a characteristic to be considered a suspect
classification for equal protection purposes. 47 Religion and citizenship are
both characteristics that are not immutable, but both have been determined
to be constitutionally suspect classes triggering the strict scrutiny
standard.48 The court held that the most important characteristics in finding
40. Id.
41. Id. at 840.






48. Id. at 841-42 (citing Owens v. City of Signal Hill, 154 Cal. App. 3d 123, 128 (Cal.
1984) (holding religion to be a suspect classification); Raffaelli v. Comm. of Bar Exam'rs, 7 Cal.
3d 288, 292 (Cal. 1972) (treating alienage as a suspect classification)).
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a group of persons to be a suspect class is whether the affected persons
have "been subject to invidious and prejudicial treatment, and whether
society now recognizes that the characteristic in question generally bears
no relationship to the individual's ability to perform or contribute to
society. ' 49 The court held that sexual orientation should be viewed as a
suspect classification and that strict scrutiny will apply for statutes that
impose differential treatment on this basis.5 ° The attorney general argued
for an intermediate scrutiny standard of review but, unlike the federal
Constitution, California does not apply an intermediate scrutiny standard
for classifications based on any suspect or quasi-suspect class.51 There is
no valid reason for applying a more rigorous standard to classifications
51based on gender, race, or religion than applying it to sexual orientation.
C. The Fundamental Privacy Right Under the California Constitution
The strict scrutiny standard of review is also applied for purposes of
the California equal protection clause when a fundamental right is
infringed. Here, the court held that strict scrutiny should also apply
because the distinction drawn by the statutes "impinges upon a same-sex
couple's fundamental, constitutionally protected privacy interest, creating
unequal and detrimental consequences for same-sex couples and their
children. 53  As noted above, one of the core elements of the state
constitutional fundamental right to marry is the right of the individual and
couple to have their officially recognized family relationship accorded
respect and dignity equal to that accorded other officially recognized
family relationships. Designating the use of a different name to a same-sex
couples poses, at the very least, a risk that the different name itself will
deny them their constitutionally protected right to such equal dignity and
respect. The court concluded the challenged statutes must be viewed as
having this constitutionally impermissible effect.
54
First, because the term "marriage" itself has a long and celebrated
history and a widespread understanding that signifies an approved and
favored institution by the community, this clearly grants considerable and
49. Id. at 843.
50. Id. at 843-44.
51. Id. at 843.
52. Id. at 844.
53. Id.
54. Id.
undeniable symbolic importance to the term.55  Providing opposite-sex
couples the exclusive designation of marriage while affording same-sex
couples a different and novel designation, will impose significantly unequal
treatment on same-sex couples.56 Second, because of the widespread
historical disparagement of, and discrimination against, homosexuals there
is a significant risk that retaining a distinction in the name marriage-the
most fundamental of relationships-will cause domestic partnerships "to be
viewed as of a lesser stature than marriage and, in effect, as a mark of
second class citizenship. 57 Third, because the public is very familiar with
the term "marriage," while "domestic partnership" is a rather novel and
unfamiliar term, the use of both terms is likely to "pose significant
difficulties and complications for same-sex couples, and perhaps more
poignantly for their children" that would be avoided if same-sex couples
were granted access to the designation of marriage.58 The court held that
the statutes must be viewed as impinging upon the fundamental privacy
rights of same-sex couples and, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny.
D. Applying the Strict Scrutiny Standard
Under the strict scrutiny standard of review for purposes of
California's equal protection clause, the state carries a heavy burden of
justification. 59 To demonstrate the constitutional validity of a challenged
statute, the state must show "(1) that the state interest intended to be served
by the differential treatment not only is a constitutionally legitimate
interest, but is a compelling state interest, and (2) that the differential
treatment not only is reasonably related to but is necessary to serve that
compelling state interest.', 60 The court framed the question as "whether the
state has a constitutionally compelling interest in reserving the designation
of marriage only for opposite-sex couples and excluding same-sex couples
from access to that designation, and whether the statutory restriction is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest.",
61
The attorney general first argued that any change to the traditional
definition of marriage should be left solely to the legislative process and
55. Id. at 845.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 846.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 847.
60. Id. at 784 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
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that, therefore, the separation-of-powers doctrine precludes a court from
modifying this traditional definition.62 The court dismissed the separation-
of-powers argument, stating that the question before it was not a matter of
social policy, but of constitutional interpretation.63 The attorney general
then argued that the compelling state interest in retaining the traditional
definition of marriage-as a union between a man and a woman-rests
upon the historic and well-established nature of this limitation, which still
applies in the majority of jurisdictions in the United States and the world.
64
While the limitation of marriage to a union between a man and a woman
may be the predominant view, the court reminds us of the dramatic
metamorphosis that social views and policies have undergone with respect
to women and minorities in only the last fifty years.65 Even the most
accepted of social practices and traditions can hide prejudice and inequities
that are rarely appreciated by those who are not subject to their reach.66
In examining the proffered compelling state interest, the court first
determined that excluding same-sex couples from the designation of
marriage is clearly not necessary to protect the rights and benefits currently
enjoyed by married opposite-sex couples. 67 Granting same-sex couples the
designation of marriage will neither deprive opposite-sex couples of any
rights, nor alter the basic legal framework of marriage, because all couples
will be subject to the same rights and obligations imposed on married
opposite-sex couples.68 Second, by exclusively reserving the term marriage
for opposite-sex couple and allowing same-sex couples only this new and
unfamiliar designation of domestic partnership, this will cause appreciable
harm to same-sex couples and their children. The court reasons this is
because this distinction is "likely to cast doubt on whether the official
family relationship of same-sex couples enjoys dignity equal to that of
opposite-sex couples. 69  Third, because of the historically widespread
oppression and disparagement of homosexual individuals, excluding same-
sex couples from the designation of marriage will likely be viewed as an
official governmental position that their relationships and families are of a
62. Id.
63. Id. at 850.
64. Id. at 853.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 854.
67. Id. at 784.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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"lesser stature" than the relationships and families of opposite-sex
couples. 70  Finally, excluding same-sex couples from marriage while
reserving it exclusively for opposite-sex couples "may well have the effect
of perpetuating a more general premise-now emphatically rejected by this
state-that gay individuals and same-sex couples are in some respects
'second-class citizens' who may, under the law, be treated differently from,
and less favorably than, heterosexual individuals or opposite-sex
couples."
71
In light of these determinations, the California Supreme Court held
that retaining the traditional definition of marriage is not a compelling state
interest.72  Without this justification the court held that "insofar as the
provisions of section 300 and 308.5 [of the California Family Code] draw a
distinction between opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples and
exclude the latter from access to the designation of marriage, we conclude
these statutes are unconstitutional., 73 The court determined that the proper
remedy was to extend marriage to same-sex couples.74 To effectuate this
ruling the court ordered that the language of section 300 that limits
marriage to a union "between a man and a woman" be stricken from the
statute.75 In regards to section 308.5, the court ruled that because the
statute's sole purpose is to limit marriage to a man and a woman, it must be
stricken in its entirety.76
III. The Dissenting Opinions
Three of the justices on the California Supreme Court dissented from
the majority. Justice Corrigan wrote a dissenting opinion, and Justice
Baxter wrote a dissenting opinion that Justice Chin joined. Justice
Corrigan began her dissent by stating that she personally believes that
same-sex couples should be able to marry; however, she recognizes that the
majority of Californians feel differently, and that the state constitution does
not compel the result the majority has reached.77 Corrigan wrote that as a




73. Id. at 855-56.
74. Id. at 856.
75. Id. at 857.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 757, 878 (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
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domestic partners have virtually all same rights and obligations afforded to
and imposed on traditional spouses. 78 However, the question in this case is
only whether domestic partners have a constitutional right to the name
"marriage., 79 According to Corrigan, the majority does not give full and
fair consideration to the Domestic Partnership Act ("DPA"), and instead of
recognizing the equality it confers on same-sex couples, "[T]he majority
denigrates domestic partnership as 'only a novel alternative designation...
constituting significantly unequal treatment,' and a mark of second-class
citizenship. '80 Domestic partnerships and marriages have the same legal
standing in California. The DPA fulfills the constitutional requirement of
equal protection, but this does not make the traditional definition of
marriage unconstitutional. 81
Corrigan disagrees with the majority's reliance on the race cases and
with its characterization of the holding in Perez v. Sharp regarding the right
to marry.82 The civil rights cases were based on enacted amendments to the
United States Constitution. And Perez, along with the other cases that
establish the fundamental right to marry, implicitly assume that marriage is
limited to opposite-sex couples. 83 This case is different from other civil
rights cases because the definition of those rights, like the right to vote or
the right to education, was not altered by extending the right to minorities
and women; here, however, the plaintiffs seek to fundamentally change the
definition of marriage into something new.84 Corrigan writes that equal
protection should not apply to the designation of marriage because the
legitimate purpose of the statutes is to retain the traditional definition of
marriage.85 She reasons that "plaintiffs are not similarly situated with
spouses. While their unions are of the equal legal dignity, they are
different because they join partners of the same gender." 86  Finally,
Corrigan believes the majority overstepped its judicial boundaries in this





80. Id. at 879.






87. Id. at 882-84.
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Justice Baxter wrote a more scathing dissent. Initially, Baxter
contends the majority has relied too heavily on the California Legislature's
passage of progressive civil rights protections for gays and lesbians in
finding a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.88 Baxter believes the
majority has allowed the legislature to indirectly amend the state
constitution and repeal an initiative statute even though the legislature does
not directly possess this power.8 9 He also believes the majority violated
separation-of-powers doctrine by infringing on the people's right, directly
or through their legislators, to decide fundamental issues of public policy
for themselves. 90 He agrees with Court of Appeal that the majority erred in
characterizing the right too broadly as the "right to marry" instead as the
"right to same-sex marriage." 91 Because Baxter finds no such constitutional
right, he reasons that the challenged marriage statutes should not be subject
to strict scrutiny and, therefore, are valid as long as they are reasonable.92 He
concludes that the statutes are reasonable and rejects the plaintiffs' due
process claim.
93
Baxter also rejects the plaintiffs' equal protection claim at the
threshold, agreeing with Justice Corrigan that same-sex and opposite-sex
couples are not similarly situated with respect to the designation of
"marriage. He contends, as do the defendants, that the marriage statutes
have at most a disparate impact on gay persons because the statutes do not
prohibit gay persons from marrying someone of the opposite sex.95 Even if
plaintiffs' claims passed the threshold, sexual orientation should not be a
suspect classification because neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor any other
out-of-state court (except for one) has ever granted sexual orientation this
status, and California should not contravene this predominant view. 96 In
addition, sexual orientation should not be a suspect classification because
only politically powerless minority groups should be granted such a
protected status, and gays and lesbians now wield considerable political
power.97 Baxter and Corrigan both found that retaining the traditional
88. Id. at 757, 861 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 864-65.
91. Id. at 870.
92. Id. at 872.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 872-73.
95. Id. at 874.
96. Id. at 875.
97. Id. at 876-77.
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definition of marriage is a legitimate interest because they and California
voters believe that this definition should be retained without any further
justifications.
Baxter, unlike Corrigan, dissents from the majority opinion on every
major point. Baxter does not even concede that same-sex couples have a
right to a legally recognized family relationship, even if it is not termed
marriage. His transparent dissent is indicative of his lack of respect for
gays and lesbians as a class of people and for their very real social and
political struggles.
IV. The Effects of Proposition 8 and Conclusion
It is important to note what the effects of Proposition 8 are on In re
Marriage Cases and what aspects of the decision have survived. As
discussed, Proposition 8 states exactly what the invalidated family code
section 308.5 and Proposition 22 stated: "Only marriage between a man
and a woman is valid or recognized in California."98 Proposition 8, like
Proposition 22, was passed by a simple majority of voters during a
statewide election through the initiative process. 99 Proposition 8, however,
was an amendment to the California Constitution. Proposition 22 was only
a statutory voter initiative and, therefore, the reason it was clearly subject
to judicial review for constitutional challenges. The state constitutional
amendment passed as Proposition 8, which is meant to override the holding
of this case and return California back to the position of exclusively
reserving the designation "marriage" for opposite-sex couples and
"domestic partnership" for same-sex couples. According to the California
Supreme Court, this differential treatment imposed by the classifications
may pose the risk of denying same-sex couples the equal dignity and
respect that opposite-sex couples are given through access to the term
marriage.100 In essence, if we call marriage something different than the
traditional term, it may mean we view if differently, resulting in potential
inequity toward same-sex couples and the infringements of their rights.
This denial of equal dignity and respect violates several fundamental
constitutional rights of the California State Constitution.'0 ' It
unconstitutionally impinges on the fundamental right to marry, which is
98. See supra note 5.
99. See supra notes 1, 3.
100. In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th at 757, 831.
101. Id. at 783-84.
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part of the fundamental rights of due process and privacy.'°2 Furthermore,
the classifications imposed by the amendment violate the state equal
protection clause because the court found that retaining the traditional
definition of marriage did not serve a compelling state interest.
0 3
However, this does not fully abrogate a same-sex couple's fundamental
right to marry under the California Constitution. The right to marry is
comprised of numerous substantive rights, including a fundamental state
constitutional right to enter into a legally recognized relationship imposing
virtually all the same rights and obligations on same-sex and opposite-sex
couples. 0 4 The DPA already grants this legally recognized relationship to
same-sex couples, but it is only legislation. 0 5 The California Supreme
Court, however, has ensured that the large number of rights granted to
same-sex couples under the DPA is now interpreted to be constitutionally
protected as rights encompassed by the fundamental right to marry under
the state constitution, a right not limited by one's sexual orientation.,
°6
Of overwhelming importance is something that Proposition 8 does not
change: sexual orientation is now a suspect classification under the
California's equal protection clause triggering strict scrutiny review of any
statute that is classified on this basis. 0 7 California is a progressive state,
and anti-discrimination statutes protecting gays and lesbians have already
been in effect, but the court has now granted them suspect class status to
ensure their equal treatment under the law. Regardless of Proposition 8, In
re Marriages sets revolutionary social and legal policy for the future in
California and possibly the nation in its legal treatment of same-sex
couples.
In effect, the California Supreme Court has done everything within its
powers to unequivocally state that it recognizes the historical oppression
and social condemnation of gays and lesbians, and that discrimination
against these groups is no longer promoted, acceptable, or tolerated by
California. Nevertheless, Proposition 8, which amended the state
constitution, achieves these results. Proposition 8, just like In re
102. Id. at 783, 809-10.
103. Id. at 784.
104. Id. at 829.
105. In 2003, the legislature enacted comprehensive domestic partnership legislation
expanding the already existing domestic partnership laws in California. See Domestic Partners
Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003, Stats., ch. 421, § 3 (codified as amended at CAL. FAM.
CODE § 297 (2008)).
106. In reMarriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th at 782.
107. Id. at 784.
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Marriages, was not going to have the final word on this matter. As
discussed, the litigation seeking to invalidate this measure is currently
pending in the California Supreme Court. Can this amendment, the
fundamental rights of privacy and marriage, and the equal protection clause
of the California Constitution stand together? This is one of the questions
posed by the litigation surrounding the validity of Proposition 8.108 As the
attorney general frames the issue, Proposition 8 should be invalidated even
if it was validly passed as a constitutional amendment because it abrogates
fundamental rights, without a compelling interest, protected by Article I of
the California Constitution.10 9  One of the lingering issues originally
ordered for briefing is what happens to the thousands of same-sex
marriages that were validly performed in California before the passage of
this proposition if the court resolves the litigation in favor of upholding
Proposition 8.110 The other two questions originally ordered for briefing
were (1) whether Proposition 8 is invalid because it constitutes a revision
of, rather than an amendment to, the California Constitution, and (2)
whether it violates the separation-of- powers doctrine of the California
Constitution.11' These questions, along with whether or not same-sex
couples will again be allowed to "marry" in California, should be
permanently and finally resolved this time. Oral arguments were heard by
the court on March 5, 2009. 12
108. This was not one of the original questions ordered for briefing by the court, but was
proffered as an argument by the attorney general in this response brief to the petitions filed to
invalidate Proposition 8. Answer Brief in Response to Petition for Extraordinary Relief at 75-78,
Tyler v. State, No. S168047 (Cal. Dec. 19, 2008), available a http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/
courts/supreme/highprofile/documents/s168066-answer-brief petition.pdf.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 8-9.
111. Id.
112. California Court Website (Proposition 8 Cases), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/
supreme/highprofile/prop8.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).
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